集值支付博弈中强Nash平衡的存在性定理
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金(No.62062018);贵州大数据统计分析重点实验室项目(No.黔科合平台人才[2019]5103);贵州省高层次创新型人才项目(No.黔科合平台人才-GCC[2022]020-1);贵州财经大学创新探索及学术新苗项目(No.2022XSXMB22)


The Existence Theorems of Strong Nash Equilibria for Games with Set-Valued Payoffs
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
    摘要:

    【目的】研究具有集值支付的博弈问题中强Nash平衡的存在性。【方法】分别基于非传递效用与可传递效用的假定,引入强Nash非传递效用平衡和强Nash可传递效用平衡的概念。【结果】在一些常规条件下,得到强Nash非传递效用平衡和强Nash可传递效用c*-平衡的存在性定理。【结论】扩展了集值支付博弈的研究范围,并把合作解存在性推广到了集值支付博弈中,为集值支付博弈的应用提供了理论支撑。

    Abstract:

    [Purposes]The existence of strong Nash equilibrium in game problems with set-valued payoffs is discussed. [Methods]By considering nontrasferable and transferable utilities, the notions of strong Nash nontransferable utility equilibria and strong Nash transferable utility equilibria for games with set-valued payoffs are introduced. [Findings]Under the regular conditions, the existence theorems of strong Nash nontransferable utility equilibria and strong Nash transferable utility c* -equilibria are obtained. [Conclusions]This work extends the research scope of set-valued payoff games and extends the existence of cooperative solutions to set-valued payoff games, which provides theoretical support for the application of set-valued payoff games.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

王能发,杨哲,刘自鑫.集值支付博弈中强Nash平衡的存在性定理[J].重庆师范大学学报自然科学版,2023,(1):139-144

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-05-05